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Abstract—The design of systems capable of protecting users’
privacy is a challenging endeavour. Since users are becoming
more concerned about the amounts of their personal data
handled, stored and shared by such systems it is imperative
to identify methods for developing privacy-aware information
systems. Current approaches either focus on the elicitation of
user requirements at an abstract high level or approach the issue
of privacy exclusively from a technical point of view. As a result,
privacy implementations are often misaligned with the overar-
ching system goals. This work improves the current situation by
presenting an approach for the design of privacy-aware business
processes. Goal models are created as a first step, for privacy
requirements elicitation, and are then transformed into process
models, thus bridging the gap between high level goals and low
level processes. Privacy process patterns are utilised for the final
instantiation of process models, achieving the satisfaction of the
identified privacy objectives through the integration of privacy
enhancing technologies. The main advantage of the proposed
approach is its ability to map privacy from the strategic to the
operational level through a semi-automatic process while offering
designers adequate guidance to its operationalisation via the use
of process patterns.
I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy has emerged as an important non-functional charac-
teristic of information systems used to implement e-services.
The volume and sensitive nature of user data handled and
stored makes privacy a major concern for users of such
services. According to recent research [1], [2], 92% of users
of e-services are concerned about the amount of their personal
data available online while 58% are troubled about the lack of
control they possess regarding who uses their data and for what
purposes. The same surveys showed that 59% of users value
online anonymity but do not believe this can be realistically
achieved. Therefore, the protection of their privacy has become
an important factor which can influence the interaction of users
with e-services.
The scientific community of the area also recognises the
importance of privacy as a criterion to be considered during
the early design stages of information systems. Nevertheless,
privacy is often grouped with other security concerns and
treated as another type of security requirement by existing
requirements elicitation approaches. However, for the devel-
opment of trustworthy information systems it is critical that
privacy is addressed separately as it is a multifaceted concept
which encompasses a variety of requirements [3].
A common approach for dealing with the privacy needs
of users when developing information systems is by using
requirements engineering methods to identify potential issues
during the early design stages of the development lifecycle. A
major drawback of such an approach is the inability to link the
identified requirements with actual solutions at the operational
level [4]. On the other hand, purely implementational solu-
tions to privacy concerns fail to take into account contextual
information and the overarching organisational strategy under
which they will operate. Therefore, an approach that would
guide the design of privacy-aware information systems from
the highly abstract strategic level up to specific implementa-
tions at the operational level, would be an effective way to
address the current issues concerning privacy.
In this work we introduce an approach for linking high level
organisational goal models, able to capture privacy constraints,
to business process models at the operational level. To main-
tain a mapping between high level goals and privacy controls,
we transform goal models, created using the well-established
Secure Tropos notation [5], as it provides concrete syntax able
to capture both goal and security related concepts, to BPMN
business process models. This transformation is facilitated by
the use of intermediate hybrid process skeletons, introduced
in our previous work [6], [7], which bridge the gap between
goal and process models, and privacy-oriented process patterns
which provide process fragments to be integrated into process
models to address privacy concerns. Thus, our approach is
able to derive privacy-aware process models, beginning from
abstract organisation goals and producing flexible operational
level solutions.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section II
discusses related work in the area of privacy and business
process modelling. Section III introduces privacy-oriented pro-
cess patterns and the approach for the goal-to-process model
transformation. Section IV presents a case study, applying the
proposed approach at the design of a real life e-voting system,
while Section V provides conclusions and discusses future
work.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Privacy Requirements Engineering
As a design criterion, privacy needs to be considered early
during the system design phase. Thus, a number of software
engineering methods supporting the elicitation and modelling
of privacy issues have been proposed. Most of them deal
with privacy as a security concept or constraint like Secure
Tropos, an extension of Tropos methodology proposed in
[5], which employs the concepts of security constraint, and
secure dependency in order to model and analyse security
issues during the requirements engineering phase. Similarly,
the SecReq approach introduced in [8] describes a systematic
approach to derive security requirements from system security
objectives. In [9] misuse cases are used in order to represent
security threats and to identify “security use cases”, i.e.,
countermeasures that mitigate the threats. Privacy patterns
have been used as a way to model privacy issues. In [10]
privacy patterns are used in the context of online activities,
aiming to convey privacy policies to end users during online
interactions. In [11] a pattern language is proposed, containing
12 patterns for developing anonymity solutions for various
domains including anonymous messaging, anonymous voting
and location anonymity.
From the legal compliance perspective of privacy, the work
of [12] uses natural language patterns and makes use of the
Hohfeld legal taxonomy, to extract security requirements from
laws and combine them with the ISO/IEC policies. Finally it
traces the identified requirements into secure system design.
Work presented in [13] describes an approach for evaluating
the legal compliance of existing security and privacy require-
ments, by establishing traceability links from requirements to
legal texts. The emergence of cloud computing has raised
the attention of researchers on the analysis and modelling
of security and privacy requirements. Some works identify
existing cloud technology vulnerabilities where various secu-
rity incidents may occur. In [14] authors present ways that
attackers can exploit data duplication techniques to access
customer data through hash-code retrieval of stored files. In
[15] the authors present ways in which side-channel attacks
can instantiate new virtual machines in order to monitor the
cached memory of adjacent virtual machines. Information or
resource misuse through security and privacy incidents is also
a very important area. In [16] authors argue that there is a
variety of privacy threats based on the cloud scenario and lack
of user control, potential unauthorized secondary usage and
data proliferation. Finally, in [17] authors suggest the analysis
of security and privacy risks as a decision-making criterion for
migrating IT services to the cloud.
B. Business Process Modelling
Graphical standards have been broadly used for the purposes
of business process modelling due the intuitive nature of
capturing and visualising the sequence of activities and the
flow of information within the organisational structure during
the enactment of a business process [18]. BPMN 2.0 [19] is
currently considered as the “de-facto standard” for graphical
business process modelling and ha been has been used as the
basis for a number of security and privacy-oriented extensions.
For instance, annotated padlock symbols are introduced in [21]
and special sets of symbols are introduced in [20] as part
of the SecBPMN extension, to express security requirements.
In such works, privacy is considered as just another type of
security requirement and no further distinction between types
of privacy requirements is made. Additionally, it is not within
the scope of such extensions to capture the rationale behind
security or privacy decisions or offer capabilities to further
analyse them, as they are limited to simply annotating existing
process models.
One proposed approach for providing rationale for design
choices at the process level, is linking organisational strategy
and business processes via the transformation of goal into
process models [22]. This approach has also been applied in
the context of security, for instance in [23] legacy business pro-
cesses are used to extract functional and security requirements,
which are then expressed via SI* organisational goal models
and, finally, transformed into BPMN specifications. In the
BP&SLA methodology [24] abstractly defined organisational
needs and executable business processes are linked via goal
models, to facilitate the selection of secure services for the
process implementation. Finally, [22] presents a framework
for designing secure socio-technical systems beginning with
the specification of security requirements, with privacy being
considered as one of them, via goal models. Next the goal
models are transformed into secure process designs modelled
in SecBPMN2. A work specialising in the area of privacy
requirement is the PriS framework [4], which incorporates
privacy requirements into business process designs via goal
models. However, the output of the framework is limited to
a “black-box” definition of privacy-constraint processes and
it does provide further guidance on the implementation of
privacy controls at the operational level.
The majority of the above works focus on security and
regard privacy solely as another type of security requirement.
Moreover, even if similar goal-to-process transformation tech-
niques are utilised by them, the means of security analysis
they offer are rather one-dimensional, as they are limited to
either a social or a technical point of view. They also provide a
static process model as output, which needs to be readjusted by
repeating the application of such approaches, when the context
under which it operates is slightly altered. The approach
proposed in this work aims to overcome such limitations by: i)
supporting the elicitation and operationalisation of all aspects
of privacy requirements, ii) allowing input during decision
making both at the organisational and operational level and
iii) allowing for an adaptable approach to process model
instantiation where a number of similar but slightly different
process designs can be derived from the same reference model,
according to specific situational needs of each implementation.
Fig. 1: General privacy implementing process pattern template.
III. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
The two main building blocks of our proposed framework
will be presented in this section. Initially a number of generic
privacy process patterns will be presented and discussed. Every
proposed process pattern realises one specific privacy concern.
These patterns will be integrated into the second build block,
a goal-to-process transformation approach. This approach is
capable of supporting the elicitation of privacy requirements
at a high level of abstraction through the use of goal models
and transform these to hybrid reference process models, which
by connecting privacy and process oriented concepts forms
a privacy-annotated process skeleton. Finally, this process
skeleton can be instantiated by integrating the aforementioned
patterns into it and refining it to a complete process model.
A. Privacy-related Process Patterns
In this section, process patterns will be introduced for each
of the main types of privacy requirements which, according to
[4], are the following: authentication, authorisation, identifi-
cation, data protection, anonymity, pseudonymity, unlinkability
and unobservability.
Each privacy-related process pattern contains a task which
implements one of the available privacy techniques, followed
by the task during which the privacy constraint activity is
performed. As illustrated in Fig. 1, both the task implementing
the privacy technique and the corresponding task at the user’s
lane interacting with it, are marked with a padlock symbol
at their top left corner, while the privacy-constraint task is
annotated with a bold line margin in order to be visually
distinguishable from regular, non-constraint tasks of the pro-
cess. Messages are also typically exchanged between the user
and the privacy control, and at the end of the interaction
a confirmation message is sent to notify the user. For each
type of privacy requirement, a different process fragment is
introduced into the template of Fig. 1 thus creating a discrete
process privacy pattern.
Figure 2 presents the process pattern for addressing the
authentication requirement, which describes the relevant activ-
ities needed to realize that process. In particular, every time a
user submits a request to the system, the system should check
that request and if authentication is needed the user should
provide the appropriate authentication data or else his access
will be denied.
The authorisation process pattern is presented in Fig. 3.
When a user requests specific services or access to data that
need authorisation then he/she should pass the authentication
process and then, according to his/her rights, get the privileges
for allowing or denying the access to a specific service or data.
The pattern corresponding to the identification requirement
is presented in Fig. 4. The role of identification is twofold.
Firstly to protect both the user that accesses a resource or
service and the user’s data that are stored in the system and
secondly to allow only authorized people to access them.
When a user submits a request related to accessing private
information or accessing personalized services then the pro-
cess of authorization is triggered and once it is successfully
completed the user is matched with an identity with specific
privileges and access rights.
The aim of the data protection pattern, presented in Fig. 5, is
to ensure that every transaction with personal data is realized
according to the system’s privacy regulations. When a user
tries to access protected data, an identification process is
triggered for identifying the user and for granting the rights
of reading, processing, storing, or deleting private data. On
the other hand, if the data to be accessed is not restricted, no
identification is required.
The pattern presented in Fig. 6, addresses the anonymity
and pseudonymity requirements. These two are joined in one
pattern since pseudonymity could be considered as part of
anonymity. First, the user’s request is checked in order to
decide whether or not identity is needed. If there is a need for
knowing user’s identity, the identification process is triggered.
Fig. 2: Authentication pattern.
Fig. 3: Authorisation pattern.
Fig. 4: Identification pattern.
Fig. 5: Data protection pattern.
Fig. 6: Anonymity and Pseudonymity pattern.
Fig. 7: Unlinkability and Unobservability pattern.
Fig. 8: Proposed framework for the derivation of privacy-oriented business process designs
If not, the user not only receives his information without
providing any personal data, but also specific techniques for
protecting his anonymity are realized. Thus, identification may
be a subpart of anonymity depending on whether or not
specific data of user’s identity are asked for processing. On
the other hand, anonymity is a privacy requirement that needs
to be protected and specific technologies should be used to
realize users anonymisation while accessing the system and
also during the whole communication. Pseudonymity is used
when complete anonymity cannot be provided but the user’s
identity needs to be protected.
Finally, the patterns for unlinkability and unobservability
requirements are presented in Fig. 7. The two patterns have a
similar structure. User asks for a request. Based on system’s
requirements if one or both of these requirements need to
be realized, then appropriate unlinkability or unobservability
techniques are used for connecting the user to the system.
B. Model Transformation
The framework presented in this work aims to produce busi-
ness process designs sourcing from high level stakeholder re-
quirements. Using this framework, the process design that best
fits the situational needs of the stakeholders can be instantiated
from a reference hybrid model. This hybrid model contains
process elements and privacy related concepts inherited by
the privacy-oriented goal model from which it is transformed.
Since the transformation process for the derivation of the
hybrid model has been covered in our previous work [6], [7],
this work will elaborate on instantiation of the hybrid model
for the production of privacy-oriented process designs. The
overall steps to be followed for the derivation of such business
process instances are illustrated in Fig. 8.
The default first step is to begin from scratch and create
a goal model of the system to be designed by taking into
account the overall organisational strategy and the input of
system stakeholders. This goal model will be the main artefact
for the identification of the system’s privacy requirements.
The alternative option requires a legacy business process to
be redesigned, the process model of which is transformed into
a goal model by following a series of transformation steps [7].
During the second step privacy requirements are elicited
and linked with the various elements of the goal model, using
the concepts of constraints, objectives and implementation
techniques, as introduced by the Secure Tropos approach
[5]. The choice of Secure Tropos, as goal-oriented security
requirements engineering method, was based on its ability
to provide flexible concepts able to capture both security
and privacy concerns and connect them to specific goals and
potential solutions. The input of organisational stakeholders
and security experts is essential for this step.
Next, the transformation of the privacy-oriented goal model
to a hybrid process reference model is performed. The rules
followed for this transformation, listed in Tab. I and introduced
in [6], are based on concept mappings between Secure Tropos
[5] and BPMN 2.0 [19] concepts, sourcing from conceptual
similarities identified by their definitions and meta-models.
Essentially, the rules describe how concepts from the initial
goal model can be transformed into equivalent BPMN con-
cepts at the process level, while maintaining the information
and interrelations between them (e.g., the structure of a goal
decomposition to plans is transformed into a sub-activity
implemented by tasks). As shown in transition #1 of Fig. 9,
by following these steps a hybrid reference model is created
which includes process elements (lanes, activities and data ob-
jects) sourcing from similar concepts of the goal model (actors,
goals and resources respectively), linked with privacy related
concepts (constraints, objectives, implementation techniques)
directly inherited from the same model.
TABLE I: Goal-to-Hybrid Transformation steps
Step 1 For each actor (a) of the goal model:Create a corresponding lane l(a) in the hybrid model.
Step 2 For each plan(p) of the goal model:Create a corresponding task t(p) in the hybrid model.
Step 3 For each resource (r) of the goal model:Create a corresponding data object d(r) in the hybrid
model.
Step 4 For each constraint (c), objective (o) or mechanism (m)connected to a plan (p) or resource (r) of the goal model:
Transfer it to the hybrid model and connect it to the
corresponding tasks t(p) or data objects d(r).
Once a hybrid process model has been created, it is used as a
reference model from which different business process designs
can be instantiated, as illustrated by transition #2 of Fig. 9.
In the final process model, the privacy constraint activities are
preceded by privacy implementing activities, as illustrated in
Fig. 9: Transition from goal model to business process instance
Fig. 1. The privacy implementing activities are structured by
operationalising one of the privacy implementation techniques,
identified at the goal model level, by inserting it as an
activity of one of the previously introduced privacy process
patterns. During this operationalisation different combinations
of the proposed privacy implementation techniques are se-
lected according to the specific needs of the process instance.
The analysis required for the selection of the appropriate
implementation techniques will be left to the discretion of
the system’s stakeholders and the privacy experts. To finalize
the process model, the activities are manually ordered and
connected to each other and to start and end events.
IV. CASE STUDY
This section demonstrates a case study applying our
methodology on an electronic voting system (e-VOTE). A de-
tailed description of the e-VOTE project can be found in [25].
The main scope of the e-VOTE system is to provide eligible
citizens the right to cast a vote over the Internet rather than
visiting an election district, aiming to simplify the election
process thus increasing the degree of citizens participation
during elections. The e-VOTE system is described by four
main principles that form the four primary organisational goals
namely: Generality, Equality, Freedom and Directness.
Specifically, generality implies that all citizens above a
certain age should have the right to participate in the election
process. Equality implies that both political parties - that
participate in the election process - and voters have equal rights
before, during and after the election process and neither the
system nor any other third party is able to infringe on them.
Freedom implies that the entire election process is conducted
without any violence, coercion, pressure, manipulative inter-
ference or other influences, exercised either by the state or
by one or more individuals. Finally, directness implies that no
intermediaries chime in on the voting process and that each
and every ballot is directly recorded and counted. Based on
three of the four primary goals of the e-VOTE system, the
Secure Tropos approach was applied for constructing a partial
goal model of the system and for identifying the relevant
privacy requirements and plans that realize the operationalised
sub-goals, as illustrated in Fig. 10.
During the requirement elicitation phase, privacy constraints
have been identified by referring to relevant legislation re-
garding the voting process and performing stakeholder anal-
ysis. The identified constraints denote certain privacy-related
restrictions which need to apply during the realisation of the
plans in order to satisfy the overall privacy objectives of the
system. As a result, the plans included in the goal model of the
system were analysed in order to determine which should be
linked to the identified privacy constraints. An overview of the
identified constraints and the overarching privacy objectives
they satisfy is provided in Tab. II. Additionally, by referring
to privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) repositories and
matching each PET to one of our privacy objectives, we
have obtained a number of implementation techniques for
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Fig. 11: Hybrid reference model of the e-voting system
satisfying our privacy constraints (e.g., encrypted channels,
onion routing).
TABLE II: Identified Privacy Constraints and Objectives
Privacy Constraint Privacy Objective
Voter cannot be matched to specific user account, Unlinkability
when authentication means are send
Voter cannot be linked to specific ballot Unlinkability
Ballots should be indistinguishable from each other Unlinkability
Allow voters to privately access the election results Unobservability
Data of voters needs to be protected Data protection
By following the transformation steps of Tab. I the hybrid
reference model of Fig. 11 is created. This model captures
the skeleton of the e-voting process and connects individual
tasks with the privacy related concepts and their potential
implementation techniques, directly inherited from the goal
model. As a result, it encompasses both process and privacy
information thereby linking the organisational goals with the
operational level. Nevertheless, certain information required
for a complete process model (e.g., ordering of activities,
start/end events) cannot be captured in the goal models,
therefore it is not included in the derived hybrid model and
needs to be manually added to the final process model during
the instantiation phase.
The last step of our approach is the instantiation of the
hybrid model to complete process models. To better illustrate
the full extent of the e-voting process we decided to split
it into three process models illustrating the activities before
(see Fig. 12), during (see Fig. 13) and after (see Fig. 14) the
casting of an electronic vote. Each privacy-constraint activity
is preceded by a privacy implementing activity, denoted by a
padlock symbol at its top left corner. Each of the privacy im-
plementing activities integrate one of the previously presented
privacy patterns and operationalise it by selecting, using ap-
propriate selection criteria (e.g., cost, effectiveness, complex-
ity), one or many of the privacy implementation techniques
proposed during the initial requirement elicitation phase. For
instance, in the process model describing the process prior
to the casting of a vote (see Fig. 12) the privacy constraint
regarding the data of the voters, satisfying the data protection
objective is implemented by the corresponding pattern (i.e.
data protection pattern, Fig. 5), operationalised by the user
credentials technique. A more detailed view of this process
fragment is presented in Fig. 15 illustrating the integration of
the appropriate process patterns within the completed process
model.
Based on the aforementioned analysis we are able to draw
conclusions regarding the applicability and effectiveness of
the proposed approach at the identification and integration of
privacy-oriented solutions at the process level. The proposed
privacy-oriented process patterns achieved a high degree of
generality allowing their smooth integration with the rest
of the activities of the business process. Additionally, the
interconnected nature of privacy requirements was successfully
captured by the patterns used to implement them at the pro-
cess level, which are composed by connecting other privacy-
oriented patterns with new activities. This was made evident
by the example process fragment presented in Fig. 15 where
the data protection pattern included the identification pattern,
which, in turn, included the authorisation pattern. Moreover,
the proposed patterns allowed us to better position PETs at
the operational level by indicating during which step of a
business process such implementations can be positioned. This
can facilitates the selection of appropriate PETs as knowing
their exact position within the process, eliminates one of the
many criteria which can influence the decision making process.
V. CONCLUSION
Privacy is an important aspect which needs to be considered
during the early stages of the design of business processes. It is
also important to align the implementation of privacy controls
at the operational level with high level organisational strategy
Fig. 12: Privacy-enhanced view of the process prior to voting
Fig. 13: Privacy-enhanced view of the process of casting a vote
Fig. 14: Privacy-enhanced view of the process after voting
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in order to be able to capture the rationale behind implementa-
tion choices. This alignment can also allow designers to easily
assess how strategic changes, captured at the goal model could
affect the operational level, captured by the process model, and
vice versa. Current literature in the area of business process
modelling handles privacy as just another security requirement
without being able to differentiate and express the variation
of the different types of privacy requirements. On the other
hand, approaches designed specifically for privacy focus on
the requirements level and do not provide guidance for the
operationalisation of privacy controls at the business process
level of abstraction.
To cover this gap, this work introduced an approach for ad-
dressing privacy-related concerns of business process designs,
which are created by transforming organisational goal models.
It also introduced a series of process patterns covering the
basic types of privacy requirements thus providing some guid-
ance on the integration of privacy controls at the process level.
Furthermore the adaptability of the proposed approach allows
the derivation of several similar but slightly different process
instances from the same midway hybrid reference model.
This is achieved by capturing all the potential implementation
solutions at the goal model level, linking that information to
specific activities at the process level via the hybrid reference
model and allowing the designers and privacy experts to
decide which solution better fits their ad-hoc needs during
the final process model instantiation. Therefore a multitude of
process designs can be derived from the same model, with
the variability sourcing from the different combinations of
implemented privacy controls. Each of the produced instances
is aligned with the high level goals of the system and its
operationalisation is guided by predefined privacy patterns.
Future work will attempt to extend the identified patterns
to cover even more complex combinations of privacy require-
ments which will allow our approach to better handle more
demanding and privacy-intense systems. Additionally, we plan
to provide further support to the decision making process
taking place for the selection of specific privacy controls
during the instantiation phase.
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